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Abstract: Obergefell v. Hodges (2015) epitomized the conflict between the Christian Right and
the gay rights movement in the Supreme Court. By acknowledging gay marriage as a
fundamental right, the Supreme Court moved away from the traditional definition of marriage
and the associated religious liberties. This thesis explores the extent to which the conflict
between the Christian Right and the gay rights movement reflects a larger conflict over claims
made to the First and Fourteenth Amendments as they relate to religious liberties and equal
protection claims, respectively. To contextualize the conflict between religious freedom and
equal protection in the Supreme Court, I analyzed four cases, beginning with the first favorable
case for the gay rights movement: Romer v. Evans (1996), Lawrence v. Texas (2003), Obergefell
v. Hodges (2015), and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018). Using amicus curiae briefs
and media coverage, I analyzed the Christian Right as its arguments transform or remain static
throughout the period, and then I developed three expectations to assess the likely outcome of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. Ultimately, I find that the Christian Right repeats arguments from
previous cases to prevent further limitation on religious freedom and to introduce new reasoning
as case issues evolve, and I find that the Court’s response to these arguments indicates an
unfavorable outcome for the Christian Right in Masterpiece Cakeshop.
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Introduction
Following its decision in Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), the United States
Supreme Court acknowledged how equal protection claims outweighed claims to religious
freedom advocated for by the Christian Right. Over the last two and a half decades, the Supreme
Court expanded protections for sexual minorities and furthered gay rights through three major
cases: Romer v. Evans, 517 U. S. 620 (1996), Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558 (2003), and
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Each case produced polarized arguments from the Christian Right
and the gay rights movement regarding the extent to which equal protection should take
precedent to religious freedom claims. Since the Christian Right continuously failed to convince
the Court in each case, this thesis determines the extent to which the Supreme Court has
delineated the relationship between religious freedom and equal protection in relation to gay
rights. Ultimately, I determine the extent to which the Fourteenth Amendment takes precedence
over First Amendment protections and assess the likely outcome of Masterpiece Cakeshop.
The relationship between equal protection and religious freedom represents the tensions
between the gay right’s movement and the Christian Right. For this reason, I examined the
Christian Right’s arguments during Romer, Lawrence, and Hodges in addition to arguments
before Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018). The period begins with Romer v. Evans
(1996) which signifies an ideological shift in the Supreme Court to use the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect gay rights (Brewer, et. al. 2000). For the next decade and half, the Court
would rule in favor of gay rights expansion, culminating in the creation of a fundamental right to
same-sex marriage in Obergefell. The final constitutional question is the extent to which freedom
of religion allows religious groups exemption from recognizing or supporting gay marriage in a
commercial context, which is the focus of Masterpiece Cakeshop. I will show that previous case
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opinions, amicus curiae briefs, and the arguments wielded by the Christian Right reveal a
pattern, which allows for assessment in Masterpiece Cakeshop and the implications for First
Amendment protections.
To recognize a pattern, I applied data to three individual expectations which would
explain how the Christian Right approaches the Supreme Court. Expectation one is that the
Christian Right repeats arguments because the Court unclearly explains the relationship between
equal protection and religious freedom, thus warranting a further ruling. Expectation two states
that the Christian Right repeats arguments to have the Court reconsider or overrule unfavorable
precedent. Expectation three states that the Christian Right presents mostly new arguments as
issues arise between religious freedom and gay rights following newly established precedent.
The case history leading to Masterpiece Cakeshop, the prior three cases in this study,
provide a foundation and springboard for analyzing the Christian Right. Given three differing
cases involving the expansion and further protection of the gay and lesbian community, each
case provides another attempt for religious groups to voice their opposition and reveal their
arguments. Before engaging my research, I address the case history and circumstances to provide
the base to understand what issue exists between equal protection and First Amendment
protections. I then describe how this research contributes to understanding the Christian Right as
a political entity in the Supreme Court and to understanding the extent of Fourteenth Amendment
protections when compared with the First Amendment. I also combine multiple data gathering
methods, bringing together the Christian Right’s formal arguments from amicus briefs and the
public arguments collected by newspapers to develop a more comprehensive view of how the
Christian Right approaches the Court. This dual-pronged approach better represents how an
interest group, or several, represent themselves and act both inside and outside the formal legal

Williams 3
setting. Based on the arguments and the argument frequency identified through the dual
approach, I determine the pattern that the Christian Right uses to approach the Court and the
arguments that the Court both considers and rejects to determine how the Court will likely
respond in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Together, the Christian Right’s approach and the prediction
reveal how the Court perceives the relationship between two fundamental rights and the
entanglement with anti-discrimination under equal protection.
The results of this thesis extend beyond the scope of the Christian Right due to the
ubiquitous nature of First Amendment protections. Although Masterpiece Cakeshop stems from
an emphasis on religious freedom, the argument heavily relies on considerations about free
speech and freedom of expression. First Amendment protections are enjoyed by Americans
every day, and an abridgement or new limitation on those rights will tangibly affect everyone’s
lives. Should the case result in a victory for equal protection and gay rights, then the First
Amendment necessarily undergoes a process of limitation, but if the Christian Right and the First
Amendment succeed, then denial of service becomes acceptable under freedom of conscience
rather than being classed as discrimination. On either side of the argument, there are
consequences which will be felt by this case, and this thesis presents a framework to analyze the
current issue in the Court and the likely outcome.
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Background
The gay rights movement, like similar civil rights movements, took shape during the
1960s, but the conflict with the soon-to-be Christian Right escalated in the 1970s. The Christian
Right, or religious right, is a “coalition of right-wing Protestant fundamentalist leaders” rising to
prominence after the landmark Roe v. Wade, 410 U. S. 113 (1973) (religious right n.d.). Legal
battles involving the religious right primarily involve Catholic and Protestant denominations,
hence reference to the Christian Right, but the group’s traditionalism and conservatism resonate
with other religious groups including conservative Judaism. The Christian Right plays a pivotal
role in cases involving the emergence of gay rights, but starting in the 1970s, there would not be
a conflict between gay rights and the Christian Right in the Supreme Court for another decade.
Despite this delayed encounter, the gay rights movement already had three foci to guide their
actions: “(1) anti-discrimination protections in the form of gay rights bills; (2) elimination of
police harassment …; and (3) eliminating the practice of unfair representations of lesbians and
gay men” (Fetner 2008). The Supreme Court cases in this study best represent the movement’s
anti-discrimination goals because these cases ultimately protected rights that Congress and state
legislatures would not. While Romer v. Evans (1996) signified a change in the Supreme Court to
use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect gay rights and sexual minorities, the earlier Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U. S. 186 (1986) defined no protections for sexual minorities.
Bowers (1986) involved a Georgia anti-sodomy law. Caught in the act of consensual
sodomy, Michael Hardwick was charged for engaging in prohibited sexual activity, and he
challenged the constitutionality of the law. The case failed in a 5-4 decision in which the
majority opinion, written by Justice White, argued that no constitutional right to consensual
sodomy existed. The decision entrenched discriminatory legislation because the case ruled
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against homosexual sodomy but not against sodomy altogether. The case reinforced the “political
power of the traditional moral subjugation of homosexuals” by rejecting “a claim of fair
treatment (an argument of basic constitutional principle if any argument is)” which is akin to
later equal protection claims (Richards 1999, 100).
Although the Supreme Court would not consider equal protection’s application for sexual
minorities until Romer v. Evans (1996), state courts relied on the equal protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to protect sexual orientation. The equal protection clause in the
Fourteenth Amendment states that the State will not “deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws” (U. S. Const. amend. XIV.) which appears in Supreme Court
precedent, especially related to gay rights, to protect a specific minority group. The Supreme
Court of Hawaii used the state’s equal protection clause, modelled after the Constitution, to
protect sexual minorities in Baehr v. Lewin (1993) (later changed to Baehr v. Miike). The case
arose when three same-sex couples applied for marriage licenses but were denied because the
state recognized heterosexual but not same-sex relationships as eligible for marriage. After
deliberation, the Supreme Court of Hawaii decided that denying the marriage licenses violated
Hawaii’s equal protection clause because it unjustifiably discriminated by sex. Baehr influenced
Congress’s decision to pass the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) in 1996 which would
disallow gay same-sex marriage for the foreseeable future.
In the same year, the Supreme Court decided Romer v. Evans (1996). The case signified
how the Court would use the Fourteenth Amendment to protect gay rights and sexual minorities
from government sanctioned discrimination. Romer (1996) involved the Colorado Amendment
Two which was a state constitutional amendment that prohibited any in-state legal support for
homosexuals. The Court ruled that the amendment violated the equal protection clause of the
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Fourteenth Amendment by specifically singling out a class of people for active discrimination.
Romer supported the decision reached by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, since Romer extended
equal protection to sexual minorities but did not fully realize gay marriage rights nor overrule
Bowers Hawaii, having already found protection for gay marriage, presented the earliest case for
gay marriage legality, but the case for gay marriage in the Supreme Court would take another
two decades. In Romer, the Court argued that discrimination against sexual minorities was
unconstitutional but ambiguously established new precedent protecting sexual minorities without
addressing previous precedent that targeted sexual minorities.
In Lawrence v. Texas (2003), the Court addressed the relationship between due process
and equal protection as they relate to homosexual conduct. Since Bowers (1986) maintained that
consensual same-sex sodomy was unconstitutional but Romer (1996) upheld equal protection for
sexual minorities, Lawrence clarified the Court’s perspective toward gay rights’ protections. The
plaintiffs were John Lawrence and Tyron Garner who were convicted for violating a Texas law
prohibiting same-sex sexual acts. The case simultaneously overruled Bowers (1986) but
counterintuitively grounded the decision in the due process clause rather than the equal
protection clause. The Court expressly determined that equal protection did not apply but due
process accorded consenting adults the right to engage in sexual activity independent from
government oversight. While a victory for gay rights, the opinion circumvented the equal
protection clause despite how the case necessarily involved an equal protection claim because
the Texas law specifically outlawed the conduct of a specific minority.
In the most recent case, Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), the Court identified the
fundamental right to gay marriage under the due process and equal protection clauses. Sixteen
same-sex couples engaged in legal battles against statutory same-sex marriage bans, and the
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question at the Supreme Court was whether states had to license same-sex marriage and abide by
same-sex marriages granted in other states. In a divided and contentious 5-4 ruling, the Supreme
Court proclaimed that the Fourteenth Amendment obligates states to allow same-sex marriage,
ruling that equal protection requires both sexual minorities and heterosexual couples have the
same marriage protections and rights. This case specifically aggravated the tensions between the
Christian Right and the gay rights movement by not providing exceptions for public officials to
abide by their religious faith nor for religious leaders to not perform same-sex marriage
ceremonies. In a one paragraph closing remark, Justice Kennedy wrote for the majority opinion
that “religions … may continue to advocate with utmost, sincere conviction that … same-sex
marriage should not be condoned,” but the opinion does not address whether religious groups
may refuse to same-sex couples, who are protected against discrimination (Obergefell v. Hodges
135 S. Ct. 2608 2015). Such protections are viewed as licenses to discriminate by gay rights
activists, but the Court has yet to rule on religion-based exemption from endorsing or providing
services to gay couples.
The looming Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018) case will address the questions
regarding First Amendment exceptions to gay marriage based on free speech and freedom of
religion. The case began in 2012 when a same-sex couple requested a cake from the owner of
Masterpiece Cakeshop. The owner, Jack Phillips, refused to create the cake because his religious
beliefs did not recognize same-sex marriages, and this led the couple to file under the Colorado
Anti-Discrimination Act for sex discrimination. The issue ascending to the Court is whether
religious beliefs are sufficient grounds to deny service to same-sex couples when that service
forces individuals to implicitly support the institution of gay marriage. The outcome of the case
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also decides religious exception in the commercial setting and any basis for sexual orientation
discrimination.
While the cases proceed in a consistent manner and progressive manner, scholars vary in
whether and how much interest groups impact the Supreme Court through formal or public
avenues. To understand where the Christian Right fits into the judicial system, it is necessary to
discuss how public opinion influences the Court and how the Court has interpreted freedom of
religion and equal protection.
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Literature Review
Literature about public opinion especially relates to this thesis because it is a method by
which the people reflect on political and issues. Public opinion is a broad concept, however, and
to narrow the literature, I emphasize how interest groups influence the Supreme Court through
amicus briefs and how they show their arguments in newspapers. Combined, interest groups use
both methods to communicate their arguments. Based on these arguments and the Constitution,
the Justices decide the extent of religious freedom and equal protection, especially regarding the
gay rights and gay marriage cases. In this section, I discuss the relevant literature that analyzes
amicus briefs, the significance of newspaper coverage, and how precedent affects First and
Fourteenth Amendment interpretation.
Beginning two-and-a-half decades ago, gay rights activism increased, largely due to a
change in public opinion regarding gay rights. Over a small period before Romer, public opinion
recognizably shifted with egalitarians supporting gay rights and moral traditionalists being the
main group opposed to gay rights, and increased political knowledge entrenched traditional
viewpoints, showing that political knowledge influences conservative public opinion (Brewer
2003). Despite a public opinion shift supporting gay rights, the country remained opposed to gay
marriage by majority, but individual states with high percentages that support gay rights are
more likely to institute legislation supporting gay marriage protections (Lewis and Oh, 2008).
While this establishes a connection between public opinion and state actions, the relationship
between public opinion and the Supreme Court is more tenuous. Typically, the Supreme Court
rules consistently with relevant public opinion, valuing the federal government’s opinion more
when it holds a similar view or when there are times of crisis (Marshall 1989). Since the Court
decided Romer and Lawrence while most of the country did not support gay marriage, the Court

Williams 10
conflicted with public opinion by expanding protections but respected the changing ideological
face of America as egalitarianism grew.
Shifting to how the Court influences public opinion, any discussion must respond to
Rosenberg’s (2008) claim that the Supreme Court has no ability to affect social change. His
analysis primarily focuses on Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483 (1954), and the early
stages of gay rights victories in the Court, but his writing does not extend to the outcome of
Hodges and its impact in the aftermath. Since the Supreme Court generally reflects public
opinion, interest groups attempt to influence the Court through amicus curiae briefs to influence
outcomes and impact social change. Research on judicial impact and amicus curiae has
culminated in an acknowledgement that public opinion is an underlying motivator.
Unfortunately, amicus briefs have relatively low impact in the Court despite how they represent
public opinion (Marshall 1989), at least in preliminary research. The media is another way for
interest groups to interact with the Court in a reciprocal way. Specific research on gay civil rights
by Stoutenborough (2006) addresses how the Supreme Court influences public opinion through
the media when cases explicitly involve same-sex relationships and rights, showing an opinion
shift consistent with the frequent negative or positive portrayals in the media. The media’s sway
regarding a case partially depends on the outlet’s skew and on the interest groups represented in
articles. Amicus briefs, however, are the primary method for interest groups to present arguments
before justices.
The Christian Right and gay rights movement use counteractive lobbying to combat one
another’s successes while bolstering their respective group advocacy (Fetner 2008). Both groups
vie for recognition in the Court by filing amicus curiae briefs. Amicus curiae briefs have a mixed
literature in relation to the Court, but filing briefs is meant to increase the likelihood of favorable
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outcomes (Epstein and Rowland 1991). Amicus briefs are written statements by interest groups
or government bodies which present arguments supporting a party in a Supreme Court case. How
much emphasis justices place on amicus briefs is unknown, but briefs reveal outcome patterns
and trends among interest groups. For case outcomes, Songer (1993) finds that litigants win
approximately the same number of civil rights and economic cases whether they are or are not
supported by amicus curiae briefs which complicates brief significance. However, later research
indicates that interest groups that file briefs experience marginally more success especially if the
group is prestigious, but the number of groups does not inherently affect the case’s outcome
(Collins 2004). Moreover, Box-Steffensmeier (2013) corroborates that brief quantity is
insignificant but determines that well-connected and influential interest groups have increased
success rates at the Supreme Court. This research suggests that the interest groups lobbying for
gay rights and gay marriage were more powerful than the Christian Right in each studied case.
Further amicus research illustrates that there is quantitative importance in addition to
content. Research by Collins (2007) finds that filing more conservative or liberal briefs in higher
quantities, irrespective of content aside from political leaning, results in a higher chance that the
court sides with the respective ideology. When groups submit briefs to a case “in that a large
number of briefs are filed supporting only one ideological position—the influence of briefs is
rather dramatic,” but briefs exhibit diminishing returns to success rates if too many are submitted
(Collins 2007). Finally, Solowiej and Collins (2009) find that interest groups counteractively
lobby in the Supreme Court by filing more amicus curiae briefs when rival groups file relatively
more briefs. Based on content alone, briefs are ineffective, but brief submission reveals trends
especially when groups are comparably influential. The research indicates that Court favor shifts
toward the side with more ideologically visible briefs from powerful interest groups, and these
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results are relevant despite these studies focusing on the latter half of the twentieth century for
data and subsequently not involving the gay rights cases in this thesis. Court decisions in the
relevant cases could signify respective interest group power and the Christian Right’s
diminishing power and influence.
After interests reach the Court and it renders a decision, the debate revolves around
freedom of religion and equal protection claims. As indicated by the history, before Romer
(1996), the Court regularly supported precedent limiting sexual minority protections and
enforcing religious protections. Kurland (1979) asserts that outcomes were so predictable that
merely mentioning establishment clause relevance would decide the case for religious freedom.
In a recent reversal, judicial involvement in religious issues related to antidiscrimination and gay
rights forces concessions that weaken religious freedom and the Christian Right’s willingness to
approach the Court (Glendon 2015). Moreover, redefining marriage to include a previously
unaccepted class of people and to create a fundamental right to gay marriage weakens the
marriage institution and raises concerns that marriage could expand to more unacceptable classes
like polygamists or pedophiles (Anderson 2017). Changing the definition of marriage from a
religious, traditional, and procreative definition to an expansive definition results, in part, from
an economic disadvantage argument which posits marriage as an economic benefit available to
everyone (Runions 2016).
Equal protection for marital access and its economic benefits revealed how economic
interest influences comparative rights claims after Obergefell v. Hodges (2015). Runions (2016)
argued that marriage took on economic significance during Hodges, but the new definition of
marriage did not address future definition changes. The new economic definition of marriage
“may also narrow imagined and actual forms of political subjectivity for LGBTQI people” by
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confining the terms by which marriage can be defined (Runions 2016). The Court weakened
marital norms to prevent discrimination and create a more inclusive marriage definition, but the
new definition places public opinion over religious freedom, reinforcing religious privatization
and making disagreement a personal issue unworthy of widespread protection (Glendon 2012).
Privatization counterintuitively weakens religious freedom and empowers gay rights: restricting
public expression for the Christian Right and traditional definitions of marriage while protecting
sexual minorities and individual identities.
Although economic discrimination is recognized in an exclusive definition, economic and
commercial discrimination based on religious objection are unaddressed in the Court. Before
Hodges, cases related to denial of service to gay couples by religious storeowners resulted in
unfavorable conflicts with antidiscrimination law, leaving owners to decide whether economic
interest or religious conviction were more influential incentives (Chain 2016). The Colorado
Cake Baker Case (2012), now Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018), and Willock v. Elane
Photography (2014) are lower cases that emblematize the conflict since both involve denial of
service due to the client’s relationship status. Since gay marriage was not established, gay
relations were the contentious point, and gay relations evoke antidiscrimination claims based on
sexual orientation (NeJaime 2012). Because Masterpiece Cakeshop pivots on religion-based
commercial discrimination, enough precedent exists to determine that the Supreme Court will
decide for equal protection and against such discrimination (Chain 2016). My research addresses
a similar question about the outcome of a religion-based discrimination claim, but I analyze the
issue through the Christian Right in the Supreme Court rather than by recognizing
antidiscrimination law’s prominence. Chain’s piece identifies the trajectory the Court has
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decided in recent cases, but this prediction does not extend to any conflicts arising from noncommercial religious discrimination issues.
Even before expanding the definition of marriage, DaLaet (2008) uniquely situates gay
rights as supportable through the First Amendment. Recognizing religious privatization and no
religious favoritism, any preference for a religious definition of marriage enshrined in law, by the
Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, necessarily violates the “no preference doctrine.” Even using
an originalist perspective to consider marriage reveals that while a right for a man and a woman
to marry exists, a general marriage right does not exist, which prevents conservatives from
arguing that same-sex marriage is unconstitutional without a general right to support
heterosexual marriage (Bunch 2005). Therefore, Bunch argues that based on a reading of Brown
v. Board of Education (1954), which supported racial minority access to public education, a
fundamental right to marry extends to sexual orientation minorities when considering a more
conservative approach. In the same way antidiscrimination applies to racial groups,
antidiscrimination should apply to sexual minorities through equal protection.
A significant impetus for expanding gay rights involves sexual orientation
antidiscrimination claims under the equal protection clause. While the traditional definition of
marriage conforms to human nature rather than intentionally discriminating (Anderson 2017),
restricting gay rights disadvantages a minority. In efforts to protect religious freedom from gay
marriage compliance, the proposed “marriage conscience protection” would provide immunities
to religious groups but simultaneously would disguise sexual orientation discrimination as
religious freedom (NeJaime 2012). However, the Christian Right supports the traditional
definition of marriage because it complies with religious beliefs, so forced compliance with a
new definition threatens religious autonomy which should be recognizable later in the thesis.
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Additionally, when comparing religious freedom and equal protection, “traditionalists and the
religiously faithful—must have diminished democratic power” if that power allows them to
marginalize a group because the group acts inconsistently with societal norms (Feldman 2015).
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment takes precedence when one group would have unorthodox
power over the rights and opportunities of another group (in this thesis the Christian Right over
sexual minorities).
Curbing religious freedom’s expansiveness is consistent with critical race theory
advocating for restrictions on freedom of speech. Religious restriction when religion impacts
sexual minorities negatively parallels restricting free speech which marginalizes and
dehumanizes racial minorities (Feldman 2015, Matsuda 1993). Arguments for religious tolerance
have paradoxically stigmatized sexual minorities because the Christian Right uses political
arguments to create an intolerant social atmosphere (Richards 1999). Both gay rights activists
and critical race theorists propose restrictions as a reaction to the prolonged injury to group
perception, dignity in life, and the suppression of oppositional voice (Matsuda 1993, Richards
1999, Richards 2005). Richards (1999, 2005) argues that adherence to religious morality is moral
slavery for dissenting minority groups which prevents their contribution to rights-based
discussion and advocacy. Silencing expression and opinions while dehumanizing minority
groups are sufficient incentives to limit First Amendment rights which hinder equality.
This thesis will focus on the arguments that the Christian Right leverages before and after
Romer, Lawrence, and Hodges, and before Masterpiece Cakeshop through amicus briefs,
Supreme Court opinions, and the Christian Right and significant social events related to gay
rights in the media. The literature in this section explains how these three areas affect the
Supreme Court and conversely how the Supreme Court impacts the public. The literature
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provides a foundation to analyze the information in newspaper coverage and amicus briefs as
they express the Christian Right’s arguments and how they interact with the Court. While some
of these academic works discuss the Christian Right’s arguments specifically, there is a larger
question about when which arguments were more relevant and how the arguments changed after
each case. For this reason, understanding how the Supreme Court influences public opinion and
newspaper coverage after a decision. I next describe how I plan to incorporate these resources
into my case study as a vehicle to analyze the extent to which equal protection takes precedent to
religious freedom. I also address how my methods are best to study these topics in an objective
sense that still addresses both the Christian Right and the larger Fourteenth Amendment
preference in the Court.
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Research Design
To study the relationship between the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, I analyzed
the Christian Right’s arguments supporting religious freedom from 1995 to 2017. Based on the
history of gay rights in the Court, this study begins in 1995 when Romer entered the docket and
ends in 2017 after the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to Masterpiece Cakeshop. The
approximately two-decade period includes Romer v. Evans (1996), Lawrence v. Texas (2003),
Obergefell v. Hodges (2015), and Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado (2018) to a lesser extent.
The more recent case history engaged the progress made by the gay rights movement and the
extension of Fourteenth Amendment protections to sexual minorities. To analyze the Christian
Right’s contemporary arguments in each case, I examined respective media coverage, amicus
briefs, and Court opinions.
To contextualize the analyzed cases, Masterpiece Cakeshop extended the analyzed period
to the present and engaged the most recent attempt to uphold religious freedom protections.
Engaging the recent years since Obergefell addressed contemporary arguments from the
Christian Right over social controversies, like Kim Davis and Masterpiece Cakeshop (before it
reached the Court). The longer period also engaged Chain’s (2016) conclusion that any case
responding to religious discrimination in the commercial setting would weaken religious
freedom. Although the Court has yet to rule on Masterpiece Cakeshop, the arguments expressed
before the case affect perception as to how and why the Christian Right approaches the Court.
On the other end, starting before Romer‘s decision captured the media conversation and
portrayals which maintains consistency with the media collection methods for other cases.
Before outlining my data collection methods, I will present the three expectations which
identify how the Christian Right could approach the Court and how that reflects the relationship

Williams 18
between equal protection and religious freedom. The first expectation is that repeated arguments
reflect areas in which the Court has yet to fully define the relationship between equal protection
and religious freedom. Expectation two states that the Christian Right repeats arguments across
cases to make the Court reconsider past decisions which ruled unfavorably on that thematic
issue. Expectation three states that the Christian Right presents mostly new arguments as new
issues arise between religious freedom and gay rights following newly established precedent.
Collecting data on public arguments expressed by the Christian Right, from newspapers,
supports each expectation due to reflecting how the Christian Right informally perceives
conflicts in the Court. Amicus briefs are the formal arguments and best indicate which arguments
the Christian Right believes deserve consideration or reconsideration. Lastly, tabulating the
mentioned arguments in the Court’s opinions verifies whether the Court has genuinely addressed
a topic. Each collection method contributes to adequately assessing and understanding which
expectation is most representative.
The first expectation requires repeated arguments that reflect issues on which the Court
has not directly ruled to clarify the relationship between equal protection and religious freedom.
A repeated argument refers to reasoning that the Christian Right uses in different cases,
effectively reusing an argument. In confirming this expectation, Court majority opinions should
not mention the repeated argument at the beginning (or at all), but dissents could address them
which would mean that the justices believe there is some merit to the argument. For instance, if
Justice Alito wrote a dissent to Obergefell about the Court not adequately considering the
possibility for future redefinitions of marriage allowing presently unacceptable unions, then the
Christian Right would advocate using this argument in the media and in amicus briefs going
forward. If the Court majority and the dissents do not mention an argument and it reappears, then
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interest groups believe that argument is still valid and deserves recognition. The Court’s opinions
gauge the validity of this expectation, and the repeated arguments over time reflect areas in
which the Court should explicitly rule. An unresolved argument could portend future political
conflicts and confrontation especially at the Supreme Court level. Masterpiece Cakeshop gains
relevance in this instance because the arguments before the case’s resolution would show which
questions thus far remain unanswered. To fully explore this expectation, future research would
incorporate the Court’s opinions after the case to identify the arguments which the Court
acknowledges and how the opinions reflect the extent of equal protection afterward.
The second expectation views repeated arguments as opportunities for the Court to
reconsider previous rulings and rollback protections or precedent. Since the Christian Right
holds a consistent opinion toward gay rights and gay marriage, the Court’s support for the
Fourteenth Amendment overcomes religious objections but reinvigorates religious groups to
convince the Court otherwise. If this holds true, there should be semi-constant participation from
religious groups and potentially more newspaper coverage as religious groups vocalize
arguments more. At present, arguments to limit gay rights expansion through equal protection
require a reversal or limitation on past precedent to institute protections for religious freedom.
Repeated arguments would thus appear if the Christian Right believes that the Court overly
restricted religious freedom and that previous arguments convincingly explain why precedent
should be limited and more freedom restored to religion. In this scenario, Court majority
opinions will mention the points in interest groups’ arguments and decide against them. Then the
Christian Right would push the same argument again in a slightly different way to reengage the
Court on previous topic. Furthermore, for this expectation I expect that the Christian Right
specifically, rather than semi-related actors, vocalizes arguments for the re-expansion of
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religious freedom. I also expect that semi-related actors will not repeat religiously independent
arguments because these actors’ arguments do not explicitly deal with support for religious
freedom. Religious organizations have the most to lose, gaining nothing from continued
argumentation in the Court and potentially resigning from argumentation if there continue to be
no victories. According to this expectation, the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment is
overly broad, and the Christian Right is receptive to excess restrictions.
The third expectation states that the Christian Right presents fresh arguments for each
new case. This expectation assumes that contemporaneous issues, like Kim Davis, play a
significant role in posing new questions about the relationship between religious freedom and
equal protection. If this is true, then the Court mentions the Christian Right’s arguments in its
decisions which are not reexamined in later cases, and I expect that interest groups and the media
cover new arguments regarding each case (those arguments can be in the same thematic vein but
need to be different). This expectation provides the most forceful depiction of Fourteenth
Amendment dominance because the Court rejects each new religious objection in its majority
opinions. Thus, new arguments would continually be created and responded to in the following
Supreme Court case, creating a linear expansion of the Fourteenth Amendment and sequential
restriction of religious freedom. This expectation poses the largest risk to the First Amendment
because the ability to tightly restrict religious freedom, and potentially freedom of speech per the
nature of Masterpiece Cakeshop, has serious implications for expression and the average citizen.
These expectations cover a range of scenarios describing why the Christian Right voices
varying arguments through the media and amicus briefs. Although there is not a similar study on
an interest group in the context of the Supreme Court, the three expectations logically address the
possible ways in which a group could approach the Court. In the context of this thesis, each
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expectation indicates a lopsided relationship between equal protection and religious freedom, but
the expectations also indicate different levels of certainty with respect to case precedent.
Certainty in the existent case precedent affects whether the Christian Right believes that change
can be made which more broadly reflects the extent to which the Court delineates the support for
equal protection’s and anti-discrimination. The first two expectations should most accurately
represent the Christian Right’s approach to the Court and the varying degrees to which the
Supreme Court has defined limitations to religious freedom. The progressing nature of precedent
and new legal issues make it unlikely for the third expectation to be true, but that does not
preclude the possibility that the Court commits to expanding equal protection. If Masterpiece
Cakeshop is any indication, then the Court has not yet discussed commercial discrimination
related to religious beliefs, so I expect repeated arguments in hopes to restore religious freedom’s
expansive protections and to clarify the extent of equal protection.
Now, as for methods to gather the media’s coverage for each case, I tabulated and
organized newspaper coverage based on the thematic issue addressed. I used The New York
Times in this study because scholarship identifies this newspaper as a reliable standard for
studying case salience and for studying media’s relevance in response to the Court (Epstein and
Segal 2000, Collins and Cooper 2012, Sill et. al. 2013) The inclusion of more papers, for
instance the Washington Post or Los Angeles Times do provide a more diverse and regional
perspective (Collins and Cooper 2015), but it was not necessary in this study to collect more
diverse perspectives, especially when those papers are ideologically comparable to The New
York Times. Other papers such as The Boston Globe and the New York Post, while reputable,
receive little scholarly attention and will remain unaddressed here due to the literary gap.
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In each of these newspapers, I searched for themes expressed by the Christian Right such
as arguments about protecting children, maintaining a proper social order, or promoting religious
freedom over forced secular interests. The timeline for inclusion in this case was within one year
of a case being granted certiorari and subsequently being decided. I measured the frequency of
these arguments, employing a frequency-based approach, to determine the importance and
popularity of each argument. The relative frequency of an argument, both within a specific case
and among the four cases revealed how impactful the Christian Right believed that argument
was. I collected articles using the ProQuest The New York Times database, which includes
articles from 1980 to the present. I used descriptive terms and appropriate keywords for each
case while searching. Terms included case name, theme (for instance gay rights, religious
freedom, equal protection, discrimination, marriage), key figures in the case (e.g. Justice
Kennedy in Obergefell for his swing vote, John Lawrence or Tyron Garner for Lawrence), and
topical issues (including sodomy, marriage, discrimination, family). I specifically captured when
an argument appeared and its relation to a Supreme Court case or social event to temporally
isolate the usage. When the Christian Right used an argument affects whether that argument
appeared in a justice’s opinion and how the Court addressed or ignored it.
A frequency-based approach to newspaper coverage avoided issue salience complications
associated with the location of an article within the newspaper. Epstein and Segal (2000)
proposed a popular measure for determining case salience based on front page coverage in The
New York Times, but this method overstated its usefulness because of the paper’s political
leaning and the demonstrated overrepresentation of liberal Supreme Court outcomes as opposed
to conservative outcomes (Unah and Hancock 2006). While not initially a concern because each
Court case resulted in a liberal outcome, essentially ensuring coverage, a more inclusive
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approach to article selection caught any articles where conservative opinions appeared which
could have shifted the article onto later pages. Since these Supreme Court cases involved civil
rights and First Amendment issues, there is a greater likelihood that journalists wrote about
outcomes regardless of the politics involved (Sill et al. 2013). By checking the entirety of the
newspaper, the frequency-based approach ensured objectivity by avoiding reporting bias and the
limitations in analyzing front page coverage. The pure frequency-based approach also ensured
maximum case coverage and inclusion for the Christian Right’s public arguments and responses
to each Supreme Court case.
In choosing how to assess the Christian Right’s changing arguments against gay rights, a
research method must respond to public opinion, which can determine whether support for gay
marriage increased or decreased throughout the period. Previous research found that the Court
influences public opinion through the media when the case involves same-sex relations
(Stoutenborough 2006) and that the Christian Right can be specifically analyzed through a
measure for moral traditionalism (Brewer 2003). Despite these studies which favorably support
incorporating public opinion polls or direct measures, the Christian Right has been markedly
consistent in opinion throughout this period. General public opinion increasingly shifts in favor
of gay rights and gay marriage (Stoutenborough 2006), but the Christian Right consistently
maintains a socially conservative perspective which does not support gay rights. Determining
their contemporary approval would provide a static approval measure that would contribute little
additional information aside from a proportional measure for the size of the Christian Right.
However, size would merely influence the quantity of arguments presented, but quantity does not
reflect ability to influence the Court since political influence is an independent measure (BoxSteffensmeier 2013). Rather, analyzing the arguments that the Christian Right wielded engages

Williams 24
their dynamic capability to change how and why they disagree rather than whether they disagree
with increasing the scope of gay rights. Public opinion only assesses current mood and does not
acknowledge interest groups’ logic, so this is a less useful method to study the Christian Right’s
consistent opinion yet varied reasoning against gay rights and gay marriage.
Not incorporating public opinion into this analysis has a drawback because of the
relationship between public opinion, amicus briefs, and case outcome. Interest groups submit
amicus briefs which describe their opinion on a topic, and research suggests that justices are
more receptive to interest groups with more significant connections and public support (BoxSteffensmeier 2013), indicating that each decision calls into question the relative strength of the
Christian Right. However, this thesis focuses on the extent of religious freedom’s limits rather
than the strength of the Christian Right as an interest group. This concern would also require
consideration of groups which support gay rights, including more liberal religious groups such as
liberal Protestant denominations. The thesis’s scope, focused on the Christian Right, limited
consideration of other religious groups and the tangential argument and research question of
interest group strength. I examined the strength of arguments used by the Christian Right but not
necessarily the groups wielding them. As such, public opinion would be a topic for future study,
analyzing how the Christian Right and pro-gay rights interest groups have shifted in terms of
strength and support, but public opinion was irrelevant here.
In addition to the statements in newspapers, I analyzed amicus curiae briefs submitted to
the Court by groups belonging to the Christian Right or that had similar thematic or ideological
leanings. I gathered Supreme Court amicus briefs via the Westlaw legal database and organized
petitioners’ or respondents’ arguments based on central theme. Amici can contain multiple
arguments, sometimes inherent to a desired conclusion, which I counted once even if they
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recurred multiple times in the same brief. A special note about Masterpiece Cakeshop (2018)
amicus briefs: since the case was not yet decided when I conducted my study, it was not
officially included in the Westlaw database, so I gathered relevant briefs from
www.SCOTUSblog.com, which doubled as a second resource for briefs from Obergefell. I
replicated the frequency-based approach used for newspapers but only for Supreme Court cases
as there are no amici for social controversies. I did not consider appellate briefs or briefs
submitted to lower courts unless groups submitted similar briefs to the Supreme Court. I
included groups with similar ideological briefs to those argued by the Christian Right’s interest
groups because actors making similar claims (a state government, for instance) indirectly
associate themselves with the Christian Right. Some arguments used by the Christian Right were
not even religion-exclusive, so any group using those arguments similarly situated itself. I then
sorted the arguments from amicus briefs by respective case and by frequency in that case.
In determining arguments advanced in amicus briefs, I recognized additional arguments
that are not mentioned during oral argument nor in Court opinions. Amicus briefs can contain
more nuanced and varied arguments than Court opinions address. A textual analysis for amicus
briefs recognizes the unique arguments that briefs often provide but that are not mentioned in the
Court’s majority or dissenting opinions (Spriggs and Wahlbeck 1997). Thus, amicus briefs
provided additional arguments which were less recognized and potentially unaddressed entirely
by the Court. If opinions mention fewer arguments than briefs, then analyzing opinions alone
restricts which arguments are analyzable. However, while opinions include fewer interest group
arguments, opinions describe which arguments are relevant to the justices (Spriggs and
Wahlbeck 1997), and the opinions describe which arguments are valid and which are no longer
valid based on the case’s outcome. As such, I also addressed Court opinions and dissents for the
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three decided Supreme Court cases because the opinions address specific arguments and their
future viability. I gathered Court opinions from Cornell Law School’s Legal Information
Institute which provides open access to case opinions. Reading Court opinions informed whether
the Christian Right repeats any previously addressed arguments and the potential reasoning for
resubmission.
After reviewing arguments in newspapers and amicus briefs, I created a total of seventeen
ideological categories which summarize the relevant arguments used by the Christian Right.
“Rational basis test / legitimate state interest” referred to a lower level of scrutiny for review in
the respective case. “Not fundamental right (not substantive due process)” means that the case
did not involve what is or what should be considered a fundamental right. “Not suspect class /
discrimination” means a party was not culpable for any discrimination because sexual orientation
was not considered a suspect class, so there was no breach of equal protection. “State legislation
/ sovereignty / public opinion” arguments involved discussion of states’ rights or allowing the
people to decide the outcome rather than the Supreme Court. “Religious exemptions inadequacy
/ necessity” means there were not sufficient exemptions for religious groups which ideologically
differed or that they should exist to protect associated groups. “Weakens Religious Freedom”
indicates that there were concerns over how much the decision would negatively impact freedom
of religion and ability to practice. “Protect / weaken Free Speech” was a similar argument as for
religious freedom but in the context of freedom of speech. “Political / federalism / democratic
process consequences” referred to damaging perception of the Court, of a state’s ability to selfgovern, of legal complications from conflicting precedent or laws, and other legal consequences.
Continuing, “Insufficient grounds for certiorari” indicates that the Court should have
rejected the respective case because there were issues with relevance or standing. “Historical
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precedent / original intent” means that previous cases, legal tradition in the United States, or the
original understanding of sexual orientation or equal protection supported the Christian Right.
“Moral / social / health consequences/importance” involved concerns over sexually transmitted
diseases, the impact on children, protecting or changing traditional moral values, the importance
of the definition of marriage, and other similar arguments. “Compelling state interest / strict
scrutiny” was a call for the highest level of scrutiny to decide the current case. “Inconclusive /
biased research” referred to how the other party wielded research which was purportedly faulty,
erroneous, misleading, or biased and that should be disregarded. “First Amendment outweighs
other fundamental rights” means that some argued for First Amendment protections (speech or
religion) being superior or worthy of more consideration than other fundamental rights.
“Heightened scrutiny / important interest met” was an argument for a higher level of scrutiny in
the case. “Foreign nation has similar policy / research” means that a foreign country conducted
supporting research into the issue or that they instituted a similar federal policy with unknown
effects. Finally, “Reverse discrimination against religion” referred to arguments that the ruling
could lead groups to discriminate against religious groups and have a legal basis for it.
The two-pronged frequency-based approach to assess the Christian Right’s arguments
benefits from addressing both public statements in the media and refined statements submitted to
the Supreme Court. As media coverage for an issue or looming case increases, membershipbased interest groups are increasingly likely to submit briefs which allow them to contribute to
the public discourse (Hansford 2004). A dual approach captures both the media discussion and
the subsequent amicus curiae briefs which interest groups draft in response. The frequency-based
measures lend themselves to a qualitative discussion of the ideological progression of the
Christian Right as it loses each case. One dimension of the thesis recognizes the public response
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of the Christian Right and the other accounts for their formal reasoning to protect religious
freedom. Based on an argument’s frequency, I analyze which issues the Court has decided and
which are still relevant or unanswered. Repeated arguments affect the analysis for potential
expectations. Repeated arguments are any arguments that the Christian Right uses in multiple
cases. When arguments reappear and for how long interest groups use them are crucial factors to
develop a comprehensive reason for why the Christian Right uses specific arguments.
These three expectations capture the Christian Right’s claims and reception, and they
reveal the degree to which the Supreme Court recognizes arguments for limiting equal
protection. Complete dismissal signifies unwillingness to curtail equal protection, while attention
toward the Christian Right’s arguments indicates that there is careful consideration to avoid
unnecessarily limiting religious freedom. Comparing argument frequency and recognition by the
Supreme Court allows for in-depth analysis for how receptive the Court is to First Amendment
concerns when claims involve equal protection.
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Data and Analysis
Amicus Briefs
Table 1 shows the arguments found in amicus briefs submitted to the Court for each
relevant case. For the latter two cases, much of the increased frequency relates to the sheer
increase in briefs submitted. The upward swing in briefs places less significance on the raw
frequencies, so I include the associated percentage (out of all arguments in that case, not for all
arguments across cases) which better encapsulates how frequently an argument appears
comparatively. Additionally, there are underrepresented arguments which appeared so
infrequently that they contributed to less than 1% of all arguments across all cases (614 total
arguments). I exclude those minor arguments which act more like outliers and contribute little to
developing an argumentation pattern.
Based on argument percentages, the Christian Right consistently wields arguments about
political consequences (i.e. improper perception of judicial review, usurping public
argumentation and resolution, weakening the federalist structure by ruling from the bench,
increasing legal conflict between religious or opposed groups and supporters), historical
precedent that precludes a certain outcome (American legal history or cultural history). The
moral or social implication arguments (i.e. definition of traditional marriage, promoting family
stability and appropriate environment for child-rearing, preventing spread of STDs) exhibit less
consistent representation than political concerns, but there is a marginally greater emphasis on
socio-moral arguments altogether.
To determine how this information reflects argumentation patterns with respect to
repetition, the Justices’ decisions and the arguments they specifically address are shown in Table
2. This includes the statements made in opinions, concurrences, and dissents. Since Masterpiece
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Cakeshop is presently unresolved, the respective opinions neither exist nor are included.
Additionally, arguments left completely unmentioned by any Court opinions are removed. A “1”
indicates that the opinion mentioned that argument as overlooked or as the proper method by
which to assess the case. A “-1” means that the opinion specifically denies the applicability of
that arguments, suggesting that a decision is possible without it or that it is unnecessary.
Table 1: Frequency and Percentage of Christian Right’s Arguments in Amicus Curiae
Romer v Evans

Lawrence v Texas

Obergefell v
Hodges

Masterpiece
Cakeshop v
Colorado
F P

Arguments
F P
F P
F P
Not fundamental right (not
8 16%
10 12%
10 4%
substantive due process)
Not suspect class /
8 16%
12 14%
26 10%
14 7%
discrimination
State legislation / sovereignty /
8 16%
9 11%
46 17%
3 1%
public opinion
Rational basis test / legitimate
5 10%
10 12%
20 7%
state interest
Political / federalism /
democratic process
5 10%
8 9%
26 10%
20 9%
consequences
Historical precedent / original
5 10%
6 7%
30 11%
18 8%
intent
Moral / social / health
5 10%
15 18%
47 18%
21 10%
consequences/importance
Inconclusive / biased research
1 1%
10 4%
2 1%
First Amendment outweighs
2 4%
4 5%
7 3%
26 12%
other fundamental right
Compelling state interest /
1 2%
2 2%
11 4%
22 10%
strict scrutiny
Religious exemption
1 2%
2 1%
8 4%
inadequate / necessary
Weakens Religious Freedom
1 2%
12 4%
33 15%
Insufficient grounds for
8 9%
certiorari
Heightened scrutiny /
6 2%
1 0%*
important interest met
Protect / weaken Free Speech
9 3%
32 15%
Foreign nation has similar
5 2%
policy / research
Reverse discrimination against
13 6%
religion
Total
49 100%
85 100%
267 100%
213 100%
Note: F stands for frequency and P stands for percentage
Empty frequency and percentage pairs indicates that the argument was not found in any briefs for that case
* Argument was not significant for given case but contributed to at least 1% for total use of given argument
among all cases
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Table 2: Coverage of Christian Right’s Arguments by Supreme Court Justices
Romer v
Evans
O
D

Lawrence v Texas

Obergefell v Hodges

Arguments
O
C
D1
D2
O
D3
D1
D2
Not fundamental right
(not substantive due
1
-1
1
1
1
1
1
process)
Not suspect class /
1
1
1
1
1
1
discrimination
State legislation /
sovereignty / public
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
opinion
Rational basis test /
1
1
1
1
1
1
legitimate state interest
Political / federalism /
democratic process
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
consequences
Historical precedent /
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
original intent
Moral / social / health
1
1
1
1
1
1
consequences/importance
Compelling state interest
-1
-1
-1
/ strict scrutiny
Weakens Religious
1
1
1
Freedom
Heightened scrutiny /
-1
important interest met
Foreign nation has
1
1
similar policy / research
Reverse discrimination
against religion
Total
5
6
7
3
4
1
6
7
4
5
Key: O – Majority opinion, C – Concurrence, D – Only dissent in case, D 1 – Scalia, D 2 – Thomas,
D 3 – Roberts, D 4 – Alito, 1 indicates that issue addressed, -1 indicates that issue specifically dismissed

D4

1

1
1
1

1
1
6

The decline in the Christian Right’s supporting amicus briefs between Obergefell and
Masterpiece Cakeshop, from 72 to 49, warrants attention. A quick conclusion is that the
Christian Right recognizes the increasingly egregious losses in the Court and believes that the
justices will decide unfavorably regardless, which is consistent with Glendon’s statements that
religious groups will be less likely to approach the Supreme Court (2015). This cursory analysis
fails to recognize how significantly the Obergefell decision predicates which arguments will
likely receive favorable treatment in the Court. In the majority opinion, Kennedy wrote that
when “sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
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consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or
stigmatizes,” which indicates that the Court will unfavorably receive arguments that perpetuate
any further exclusion with religious foundations (Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2603 2015).
As such, an argument for any sense of state power to decide whether economic or service
discrimination is acceptable for religious reasons immediately conflicts with this statement,
which would not receive full consideration from the Court. Over the course of three cases, the
Court consistently ignored claims about states’ rights, and the dissents in Obergefell present little
support for further argumentation about public debate because the case forecloses the discussion
about same-sex marriages. As such, the argument contribution for state-based and public
legislation arguments drop from a high of seventeen percent to one percent. The three remaining
arguments emphasize that a state should be able to decide whether its citizens have any claim to
exemption which ties into another category.
There is a slight increase in arguments for religious exemptions specifically, from one
percent in Obergefell to four percent in Masterpiece Cakeshop, since exemptions already exist
for religious groups to not perform same-sex marriage ceremonies. By extension, the Christian
Right, in both amicus briefs and in the media, advocates for further exemptions in terms of
conscience and expression. The increasing reliance on arguments to protect freedom of speech
and expression (seven percent in Obergefell and fifteen percent in Masterpiece Cakeshop) is a
new shift after the rejection of arguments related to legitimate interests in protecting the
traditional definition of marriage. An evident shift appears as all arguments for rational basis
review end completely after Obergefell, and there is a significant increase in arguments
supporting strict scrutiny, up to ten percent in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Advocates argue that
“business run on religious principles sometimes be exempted from generally applicable laws” in

Williams 33
accordance with Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. ___ (2014) (Liptak 2017). In
comparing two fundamental rights, strict scrutiny is the most appropriate method to determine
which right has a greater case relevance, but religious groups did not heavily rely on higher
levels of scrutiny until 2017. While there is minor reliance on compelling interests as far back as
Romer (at one mention), the argument is not seriously considered until Hodges. While rational
basis review is the ultimate standard the Court uses in Romer and Lawrence as shown by
majority mention in Table 2, some amici address rational basis and then extend further to argue
that there is a compelling interest. The Christian Right is unfazed by negative reception of this
argument, only mentioned in one dissent by Scalia and then rejected in the opinion in Obergefell,
the increased emphasis in the latter case is a significant shift. However, there is no evidence that
the Court would favorably receive this argument based on the previous rejection of strict scrutiny
to prevent same-sex couples from engaging in the institution of marriage, never mind any sort of
public accommodation.
In a similarly counterintuitive maneuver, the Christian Right shifts from showing how it
does not discriminate against homosexuals to how supporting homosexuals discriminates against
religious groups. The discrimination and abridgement of equal protection appears in every
opinion and occurrence from the Court, to varying degrees. In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in
Lawrence, she wrote that while a “law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law
is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual” (Lawrence v. Texas 539 U. S. 583
2003), so the law breaches equal protection by targeting a specific class. In reverse, the Christian
Right argues that any decision further limiting the First Amendment would allow discrimination
toward religious groups that speak unfavorably about same-sex marriage. Because this argument
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is unique and case-specific, it aligns with the third expectation as a reframing of opposition to
gay marriage.
The case for reverse discrimination is one of the few completely new arguments to
emerge, since most arguments change support rather than theme. For instance, the moral and
social significance argument is semi-consistent but varies in some interpretations. For instance,
Lawrence amici emphasized a dangerous precedent that overruling Bowers would inevitably lead
to a case dismantling the traditional definition of marriage, whereas amici in Obergefell
emphasized the importance of family stability for the proper rearing of children and the forced
imposition of children in same-sex homes would create unknown and potentially damaging
effects. A common theme is that marriage benefits children who “will be reared by their
biological mother and father in a committed bond” which benefits family and society (Brief for
47 Scholars 2015). The opinion engages this idea but then changes to focus to an argument about
how children raised by non-married parents are detrimentally affected and believe themselves
lesser, but this confirms that the Court is conscious of the arguments about the youth. However,
there is a deeper issue, not mentioned in briefs, about the future education of children and the
cyclical nature of gay marriage acceptance. A very direct quotation in a NYT article claims that
acceptance of new gay-themed TV shows is “’acceptable for that element in our culture that’s
already earning an advanced degree in Sin Acceptance’” (Bernard Weinraub 2003). The danger
is that accepting gay marriage and believing it to be normal will influence the future generation
which will crave or be comfortable consuming entertainment that presents gay relationships.
This train of thought does not appear in any of the amici analyzed, but they do appear in the
media as a unique argument against same-sex marriage.
Newspaper Coverage
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Having mentioned newspaper coverage several times, I must address the limited coverage
given to the Christian Right in The New York Times. While research indicates that liberal
Supreme Court opinions receive more front-page coverage (Unah and Hancock 2006, Sill 2013),
there is a distinct lack of information about religious groups and their interaction with Court
cases, even though this is outside the scope of the cited media research. Most comments by
religious or socially conservative groups are confined to short sentences or are summed up as
general feelings about a case rather than providing any indication about reasons to not support
same-sex relationships. As already shown though, there are articles which display arguments by
the Christian Right, but the number is low. Consider Lawrence: Out of 109 articles that match a
search for Lawrence and sodomy, only thirty-two are inside the range from 2002 to 2004, and
out of those, only eighteen present relevant information about the Christian Right or conservative
groups. The lack of more media coverage produces a basic familiarity with public arguments by
Christian groups, but the information lacks detail. By combining the media arguments with
amicus curiae arguments, greater clarity exists as the two explain or reinforce one another. For
this study, there is enough consistent information to generalize the public arguments, but the
explanations are not specific enough to tabulate like amici arguments. Instead, I will summarize
the arguments espoused by the Christian Right in the media for the relevant period.
As previously identified, arguments for protecting youth perception of homosexuality are
unique to media coverage. This extends all the way to coverage before Romer entered the Court.
In a similar resolution to prevent special status for homosexuals, Lon T. Mabon, chair of the
Oregon Citizens Alliance, argued that homosexual behavior is not “’a basis on which minority
status should be granted’” and that the idea should not “be taught to our kids’” (Dunlap 1994).
Educating future generations remains important through Lawrence due to expansion of same-sex
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protections for sexual practice, but this argument ceases by Obergefell, shifting toward more
family-related concerns than education-related concerns. Oddly, there is an argumentation gap in
Lawrence because none of The New York Times articles commented on children or statements
about protecting educational circle. This is especially odd because as Table 1 shows, there is an
increase in arguments about the social ramifications of ruling against the Texas sodomy law
(increasing from ten percent in Romer to eighteen percent in Lawrence), but the media portrayal
of the Christian Right is absent in this line of argument.
The major shift after Lawrence in the media expresses fear and concern about the opened
door for gay marriage cases. Shortly after the case concluded on June 26, a judge in New Jersey
Superior Court heard a case for gay marriage. The consensus among the Christian Right in these
articles is that “any change in the definition of marriage … was not open to interpretation”
(Jacobs 2003). The focus shifts to the threat for the traditional definition of marriage which
supports the increase in arguments about moral significance because this argument starts to
appear in amicus curiae. Justice Scalia further supported concern for moral consequences
because the opinions in the case leave “on pretty shaky grounds state laws limiting marriage to
opposite-sex couples” (Lawrence v. Texas 539 U. S. 601 2003), but Scalia lumped the marriage
definition into a political consequence rather than engaging the moral or social consequences of
expansion. The overall idea is that Lawrence opened the door for same-sex marriage arguments,
and a member of the Court notes that the issue will likely reappear as a result. The public
declaration favored the Christian Right though, narrowing discussion about marriage to how it is
“essentially a religious institution intended explicitly for a man and a woman” (Bumiller 2003)
which would mean that to change the traditional definition would infringe on religious groups.
The immediate discussion about the potentiality for a gay marriage case supports the continued
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argumentation for the moral importance of marriage leading into Obergefell. As shown in Table
1, the social and moral arguments in Obergefell remain proportionately consistent with those in
Lawrence, remaining at eighteen percent frequency.
Media arguments about state sovereignty in the domain of sexual relations and influence
in marriage remain prominent until after Obergefell. Shortly after Romer, the American Center
for Law and Justice (an advocate for religious rights) emphasized that the case “’undercut the
right of citizens to preserve their view of sexual morality’” (Dunlap 1996). At an early stage, the
Christian Right defended state’s rights and the people’s ability to decide which special
protections the state bestows. However, argumentation slightly shifts after Lawrence to warn
against the danger that weaker state control over sexuality could have to allow unacceptable
forms of sexual behavior. The Christian Right publicly agreed with Justice Scalia’s dissent which
“suggested that the ruling opened the way for judicial sanctioning of other sexual activities that
have been traditionally outlawed by states” (Lewis 2003). Relating to moral and social
consequences in addition to states’ rights, the Christian Right begins to warn against further
degradation of state control because it removes all control over sexual behavior despite the
voices of its residents. Table 1 supports this argument, showing an emphasis on state’s rights and
influence in both Romer (sixteen percent frequency) and Obergefell (seventeen percent
frequency).
Shortly after the decision in Obergefell, the same-sex service denial by Kim Davis
brought religious idealism to the forefront of American politics. As a microcosmic representation
of the conscience conflict in Masterpiece Cakeshop, the case caused a slight divide in the
Christian Right as non-enforcement heralded praise from many religious groups. On the other
hand, Mormons voiced disapproval in an official statement that citizens have “a duty to follow

Williams 38
the law, despite their religious convictions” (Healy 2015), but this sentiment is not echoed
among other socially conservative religions in the Christian Right. This was the first public sign
of discord by Mormons, but outside this sudden declaration, the response by other religious
organizations was sympathetic toward Davis and other “public employees who say sanctioning
same-sex marriage undermines their religious freedom” (Sheryl 2015). This argument is
consistent whenever The New York Times mentions Kim Davis and religious groups or social
conservatives. Interestingly, the Supreme Court opinions in Obergefell said that religious groups
could still hold and advocate their beliefs about same-sex marriage, but the conflict ignited
immediately with Davis. Her demonstration and the issue it presents coincide with the increase
of amicus briefs arguing for the primary position of the First Amendment and the dangerous
erosion of religious freedom that could result from Masterpiece Cakeshop. Whether the Court
agrees with this conclusion is yet to be officially seen, but the analysis of the progressing
argument used by the Christian Right provides sufficient information to determine the
argumentative pattern.
Based on the three sources of data and arguments, there is support for each expectation
about argumentative pattern. However, for each expectation to hold true requires that the
Christian Right primarily adds new arguments during each case and primarily repeats previous
arguments, which is not possible. For reference, the three expectations are as follows: 1)
repetitive arguments to address issues which the Court has not addressed, 2) repetitive arguments
are the Christian Right’s attempt to reverse precedent or regain ground on already decided issues,
and 3) the arguments are always new which means that previous arguments were specifically
addressed by the Court.

Williams 39
From the outset, some arguments are never discussed by the Court or are negated as
unnecessary to the case. In Lawrence, the arguments about improvidently granting certiorari are
not engaged by the Court nor are mentioned in media arguments, which indicates this argument
was completely ineffective, and no future arguments relate to improper certiorari nor to
Lawrence being based on faulty review. The arguments for heightened scrutiny present a mixed
relationship with the expectations. Justice Scalia broached the idea that heightened scrutiny
could even be considered before the Christian Right ever mentions it, but he ultimately
concludes that, like in Bowers, “criminal prohibitions of homosexual sodomy are not subject to
heightened scrutiny” (Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 594 2003). That is the sole mention of
heightened scrutiny in an opinion, and the dissent rejected the applicability of this level of
scrutiny, but the Christian Right asserts this argument in the following two cases. This appears to
be running into a precedent brick wall since the argument is completely unsupported by a justice,
opinion, or previous case in this study. The sudden inclusion of heightened scrutiny arguments
thus appears counterintuitive given the Court’s negative stance toward rational basis review
which is a lower level of scrutiny. The Justices likewise ignore arguments about biased research,
which studied the potential yet unknown effects of same-sex parents on child development.
Neither the majority nor the dissent addressed research validity claims, reflecting how these
claims had little impact on the decision. These three themes, while producing a percentage of
total arguments in these cases, produce no effect nor have any measurable influence.
Prominent Explanations
In support for the second expectation, the Christian Right consistently relies on rational
basis review to defend state actions toward homosexuals. These arguments typically relate to
those for state legislative power and states’ rights, and both themes substantially drop after
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Obergefell. Due to the decisive statements against state power and for a swift end to public
debate which continues to marginalize a suspect class, the support for states’ rights drops to
nearly less than one percent. The same is true for rational basis review arguments which receive
completely end after Obergefell, influenced by the establishment of a fundamental right to gay
marriage which places the subject outside the purview of rational basis to infringe on a
fundamental right. Rational basis arguments end completely, but the earlier continuance despite
continued rejection to legitimate state interest arguments suggests that the Christian Right
intended to change the Court’s set opinion about the applicability of a lower level of review.
Even though the arguments increased in frequency, the reliance on the method did decrease and
then cease. The accompanying argument for gay rights being a state issue also stopped with
rational basis review after an equally shaky track record. Of course, the shift to arguments for
compelling state interests shifts the argumentation to strict scrutiny which necessarily ends
arguments supporting lower review. However, the three-case reliance on continually rejected
arguments (which are always addressed by the Court) supports the second expectation.
The historic arguments based on culture and American history also support the second
expectation. The majority and dissenting opinions conflict in terms of how to apply historical
tradition. Justice Kennedy wrote in the majority on Lawrence that “there is no longstanding
history in this country of laws directed at homosexual conduct as a distinct matter” (Lawrence v.
Texas 2003), but Scalia wrote in his dissent in Obergefell that the states have always had
exclusive power over domestic relationships, which includes sexual conduct. Historic arguments
likewise fluctuate in amicus briefs, remaining around ten percent inclusion and are continuously
used despite being countered in majority opinions. The persistence to argue for a historic
disapproval of same-sex relations and state control over defining marriage defines an attempt to
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convince the Court that the historic approach has merits and should compel a reconsideration of
precedent revoking control from the states. As such, historic arguments likewise support the
second expectation as the Christian Right repeats arguments to undo precedent.
The arguments for compelling interest would support the third expectation had they not
been argued during every case, making them more supportive of the first expectation. The
rejection of rational basis necessarily rejects strict scrutiny arguments, so the persistent increase
in such arguments indicates that the Christian Right increasingly saw justification for limitation
on equal protection when considering compelling state interests. However, the interaction
between the amici and Court opinions indicates a closer connection with repetition for the sake
of reversal. Justice Roberts writes in his Obergefell dissent that while “the policy arguments for
extending marriage to same-sex couples may be compelling, the legal arguments for requiring
such an extension are not” (Obergefell v. Hodges 135 S. Ct. 2612 2015). Considering such a
statement, the increased argumentation for compelling interests to protect religious freedom and
freedom of speech in Masterpiece Cakeshop liken to the rationale that Justice Roberts uses in his
dissent. However, per the definition of the first expectation, the majority opinions should not
mention the argument and the dissents support readdressing the topic. Therefore, the strict
scrutiny argument supports the first expectation.
As mentioned earlier, one of the only strong, new arguments is about reverse
discrimination toward religious groups. However, there is also a significant increase in
arguments for protecting religious freedom against further limitation and for protecting free
speech, but these necessarily increase per the nature of Masterpiece Cakeshop involving freedom
of religion and freedom of speech claims. The emergence of a new issue and new approaches to
argue for protecting religious freedom do support the third expectation though. The dissents in
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Obergefell warned that conflicts would arise between religious exercise and a fundamental right
to gay marriage, and Masterpiece Cakeshop is the first attempt to argue for religious protections
after the establishment of that right. The previous claims for free speech and a significant
weakening of religious freedom going unheeded would support the first expectation, but the
overwhelming increase in frequency in Masterpiece Cakeshop indicates that the arguments
gained an increased and foundational importance rather than being minor supporting arguments.
The arguments for the danger in weakening religious freedom and for protecting freedom of
speech therefore apply to the third expectation.
Based on these relationships between the arguments and the three expectations, the most
significant expectation is the second, followed by the third. The Christian Right continuously
exercises arguments that are addressed and rejected by the Court to no new effect. These failed
arguments drop considerably or completely after Obergefell to make room for new arguments
and approaches to the Court which emphasize the importance of First Amendment protections in
the face of anti-discrimination precedent. Although all arguments are not new in every case,
Lawrence and Masterpiece Cakeshop present many fresh arguments which dramatically increase
and refocus before the Court officially addresses them. While expectations two and three are
most common, there are repeated arguments which appear and are not initially addressed
(compelling interests), but as discussed, that argument closely aligns with the criterion for the
third expectation.
The prominence of previously rejected arguments and the unrecognized nature of new
arguments indicate that the Court is unreceptive to arguments currently used by the Christian
Right. Due to the new arguments, there is no concrete evidence in the current cases about
whether the justices will find the new arguments more convincing, but the response pattern from
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the Court indicates that the Christian Right’s arguments will either be ignored or summarily
dismissed. In either case, First Amendment precedent is detrimentally set, limiting freedom of
religion and expression, but further restriction would crush any future argumentation in the Court
regarding equal protection and religious freedom. As Chain (2016) discusses, the Supreme Court
just needs to rule on religion-based economic discrimination and few questions regarding
religion and discrimination will remain.
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Conclusion
The goal of this thesis was to clarify the relationship between the Christian Right and the
Supreme Court and between freedom of religion and equal protection. Given the precedent
related to gay rights and the establishment of same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court ignores or
disregards argumentation by the Christian Right. The majority rejects the repeated arguments
submitted and leaves unanswered questions which would indicate a more definitive outcome in
Masterpiece Cakeshop. However, I established through the analysis of media, amicus briefs, and
Court opinions that the Christian Right employs two main strategies to influence the Court
through its arguments: by repeating arguments to have the Court readdress unfavorable precedent
to overrule it and by developing completely new arguments which the Court has not previously
addressed. The results imply that the Court will continue to rule against the Christian Right
because of the pattern that has developed, and this has implications for other First Amendment
protections. Freedom of speech is a significant target because of recent controversy over the use
of hate speech and the negative and discriminatory impact it has on minorities (Matsuda 1993).
A ruling in favor of equal protection when the Court is also addressing First Amendment
protections opens the door for other concerns about freedom and access versus discrimination.
The ruling would be a death knell for religious freedom as well because any situation involving
religion and any type of discrimination would disfavor religious groups automatically despite
their beliefs. While this is not necessarily a negative consequence, there is a danger that religious
groups will face reverse ideological discrimination. However, this wholly depends on the
outcome of Masterpiece Cakeshop, so there will be a wealth of information to further analyze the
relationship between the First Amendment and equal protection after the case resolves later this
year. In all likelihood, the Court will rule against the Christian Right and First Amendment
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exemptions in favor of anti-discrimination and equal protection, given the track record that the
Christian Right has in the Court.
As I have mentioned throughout the paper, I eschewed certain topics to narrow the
thesis’s scope and to preserve ideological focus, but future study into the relationship between
equal protection and religious freedom could address the following topics. Regarding newspaper
selection, there is an argument to make for inclusion of the big four: The New York Times, The
Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, and Chicago Tribune. The combination provides
ideological variety and a regionally inclusive perspective (Collins and Cooper 2012, Collins and
Cooper 2015, Segal and Cover 1989). Further study could also isolate the Christian Right in the
media and analyze the specific relationship between arguments in the media and public sphere as
they compare to Court decisions. A specific study of religious representation in media could also
include religious newspapers or news sources, which while potentially biased would provide the
most comprehensive and direct arguments from the Christian Right.
Public opinion also warrants revisiting because of the connection among opinions,
amicus curiae, and Court decisions. Including public opinion would provide a direct linkage
between the people state protections or restrictions for gay rights. The vacillate nature of public
opinion as it shifts based on Court verdicts and arguments would complement an analysis of the
socially liberal outcomes in the Court. For instance, a Gallup poll after the ruling in Lawrence
revealed a retrenchment on gay marriage: it “found that 57 percent opposed gay civil unions” but
earlier that year “a similar Gallup poll found that only 49 percent were opposed” (Bumiller
2003). A public opinion shift also influences perception of the Court and amicus briefs by gay
rights supporters which claim that public opinion generally favors the expansion and protection
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of gay rights. Public opinion provides a deeper, people-focused analysis of the past two-and-ahalf decades in gay rights precedent.
A two-pronged approach is also not necessary. The multifaceted method I used including
the media, public arguments, and amicus briefs, formalized arguments, comprehensively
encompasses the Christian Right and the arguments believed most salient in both domains. These
arguments can differ, and, as with media, focusing on one source of arguments would develop a
deeper understanding about how the Christian Right utilizes that medium to its fullest and how
those included arguments specifically interact with the Court. Studying federal cases and the
amicus briefs in those cases would provide an additional insight into how the Christian Right
initially prepared arguments which may evolve before reaching the Supreme Court level.
Including federal cases better captures how arguments change, especially in the large expanse
between Supreme Court cases.
By the end of this year, the Supreme Court should rule in what will be the monumental
Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado, but until that decision, scholars can only theorize which way
the case will swing. In this thesis, I outlined the arguments and interactions the Christian Right
uses and how they interact with the Supreme Court, and I showed how the pattern is unfavorable
for any argument that they use. Only time will tell, and the implications for religious freedom
and free speech are undoubtedly significant, either providing a solid defense for religious
believers or eroding the religious freedoms which have been a significant part of America’s
history and foundation. Either way, the implications for strengthening or weakening religious
freedom extend beyond the scope of religious groups specifically. Only time will tell, but at
present, one remains less than fourteen.
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